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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1954 TERM
those premises for a school for mentally retarded children, 9 in violation of a zoning
ordinance, ° the defense was that the existing use as a school for mentally retarded
children was a mere continuation, although by a different owner, of a previous
non-conforming use, such continuation being specifically permitted by ordinance.
The Court, in denying an injunction, held that the previous use as a convalescent
home for cardiac children, an incident of which use was the schooling and instruction of the children who were there confined, was the same as the present use. In
support of its decision the Court relied on the public policy of the state to enforce
the education of children, 12 and concluded that since education of the children in
the convalescent home was favored, the present use of the property as a school
for mentally retarded children is merely a continuation of the con-conforming use
in a limited and restricted fashion.
Judge Conway, dissenting, questioned the previous non-conforming use, it
being ultra vires for the previous owner to conduct a school. As its charter provided
only for the operation of a convalescent home, there could be no legal non-conforming use as a school, and consequently the present use was illegal. Conceding
however that previous use of the premises was partly for school purposes, the
difference in the character of the students would make maintenance of an
3
"identical" non-conforming use, as required by ordinance, impossible.1
Sale of Schoolhouse
The New York State Education Law provides three methods for the disposition of unused school houses or sites. 14 In Ross v. Wilson 15 a majority of the Court
held that where a central school district had taken over an existing common school
district and a meeting was called to consider the disposition of an old schoolhouse
of the former district, the voters had no right to approve a sale at a price lower
than the highest offer. The meeting, which had before it the high bid of a Grange,
had no power to sell to a church which had made a lower offer, the former not
being an objectionable use. This was held despite the language of the statute' 6
9. Rogers v. Ass'n for Hetp of Retarded Children, 308 N. Y. 126, 123 N. E.
2d 806 (1954).
10. Pelham Manor Zoning Ordinance.
11. Ibid.
12. N. Y. CONST, art VI, § 7; N. Y. EDUCATION LAW art. 65.
13. Pelham Manor Zoning Ordinance.
14. N. Y. EDUCATION LAW § 402 provides that when the site of a school house
has been changed, the voters of the school district involved may by majority vote
at a meeting sell the old property at such price and upon such terms as they
shall deem proper. N. Y. EDUCATION LAW § 1804 provides that when a central
school district is formed, the property of the former common school district may

be sold upon the majority vote of the qualified voters of the former district and
the proceeds apportioned among the taxpayers of that district,
15. 308 N. Y. 605, 127 N. E. 2d 697 (1955).

16. N. Y. EDUCATION LAW 9 402.
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which the Court applied to the situation, disregarding the other two sections cited
above which bear on the sale of school property and which the Court admitted
would be more appropriate here. The section was construed to mean that the
electors may use their judgment as to what is the highest price, but where a
higher offer is before them, they are bound to accept. The majority are deemed to
be trustees, in a fiduciary relationship to the non-consenting property owners,' 7
and bound to get the best price.' The action taken by the majority of the school
district was also held to be illegal as a gift of property to promote objectives
outside the scope of the Education Law,' 9 and especially illegal as a gift of public
money to a religious establishment. 20
A vigorous dissent maintained that the statute 2' was applicable to give the
majority of the voters a free rein in deciding to whom and for what uses property
can be sold. The dissent was further based on the grounds that the statute pro22
viding there be no appeal from a decision of the State Education Commissioner
23
was applicable here, since his decision could not be deemed arbitrary. To prevent
abuses of authority by cliques in school districts, however, it would appear that
the majority view is more realistic.
Power to Maintain Parking Garages
No city in New York may give or loan its credit to or in aid of any individual
or any public or private corporation. 24 This does not prevent a city from making
a gift of money or property25 where such a gift is to further a proper public
governmental function.20 In Comereski v. City of Elmira,2r the court held a contract
between the City of Elmira and the Elmira Parking Authority,28 which provided
that the City pay to the Authority an amount equal to the deficit in the funds of
the latter which were available for the payment of Authority bonds, to be a valid
exercise the City's power. The City had the power to construct and maintain
parking garages,29 and funds spent here were used for a proper public use and
17. Godly v. Crandall cd Godly Co., 212 N. Y. 121, 105 N. E. 818 (1914).
18. Berner v. Equitable Office Bldg. Corp., 175 F. 2d 218 (2d Cir. 1949).
19. N. Y. EDUCATION LAW § 414.
20 U. S. CONST. Amends. 1 and 14; N. Y. CONST. art. 9, § 4.
21.

N.

Y. EDUCATION LAW § 402.

22. Id., § 310.
23. Levitch v. Board of Education, 243 N. Y. 373, 153 N. E. 495 (1926).
24. N. Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 1;Union Free School Dist. No. 3 v. Tow?& of
Bye, 280 N. Y. 469, 21 N. E. 2d 681 (1939).
25. Ibid.; Western N. Y. Water Co. v. Erie County Water Authority, 305
N. Y. 758, 113 N. E. 2d 152 (1953).
26. Denihan Enterprises, Inc. v. O'Dwyer, 302 N. Y. 451, 99 N. E. 2d 235
(1951).
27. 308 N. Y. 428, 125 N. E. 2d 241 (1955).
28. N. Y. PUBLIC AUTHORITIEs LAW § 1482 et seq.
29. N. Y. GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAw § 72-j.

